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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ward this position. In the Hubbard, Ball, and Kaufman cases the foreign
decree's invalidity was used as a ground for annulment and the New York
courts recognized the decree in order to defeat the action, while in the prin-
cipal case as well as in the Fischer case the foreign decree's invalidity was
used as a defence and the court turned around and refused to recognize it.
If the New York policy is to protect its citizens it should be consistent and
not place its grounds of recognition or non-recognition on the mere absence
of a showing that the defendant in the foreign divorce proceeding was a
citizen of New York at the exact time the decree was handed down.
In the principal case the first husband had actual notice of the pendency
of the suit. This fact is of no consequence in New York, Williams v. Williams
(1891) 130 N. Y. 193, 29 N. E. 98; but in other states such a showing would
be taken very favorably in recognition of such decree on the principles of
comity. Felt v. Felt (1899) 59 N. J. Eq. 606, 45 At. 105; Kenner v. Kenner
(1917) 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S. W. 779. The need for a uniform system of
divorce laws in the several states is manifest. There should be a better ap-
plication of the principles of comity at least to prevent the anomalous situa-
tions of having a marriage considered valid in one state and a meritricious
relation in another. S. M., '34.
HoMicID-KiLLING ANOTHER IN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT SuIc=E.-The de-
fendant drew a revolver from his pocket with the intention of committing
suicide. The deceased interfered and tried to prevent him. In the ensuing
struggle the defendant's revolver was discharged, and the deceased was
fatally wounded. The jury was instructed by the trial judge that suicide
is an offense in the eyes of the law and that if a man, with a deadly weapon,
undertakes to take his own life and in consequence takes the life of an inno-
cent party, he is guilty of murder. The defendant was convicted of murder
in the second degree. On appeal, held: The attempt to commit suicide, not
being made unlawful by statute in Iowa is not an unlawful act, and hence the
accused was not guilty of murder. State v. Campbell (Iowa 1933) 251 N. W.
717.
The question of whether an unintentional homicide caused in an attempt
to commit suicide will constitute murder depends upon whether suicide is
held to be a crime in the particular jurisdiction. If suicide is deemed a
felony, then any homicide committed in the commission of, or in an attempt
to commit suicide is murder. State v. Levelle (1890) 34 S. C. 120, 13 S. E.
319. If suicide is not a felony but is recognized as an unlawful act, any
homicide unintentionally caused in the attempt to commit suicide is held
to be manslaughter. State v. Lindsey (1885) 19 Nev. 47, 5 Pac. 822.
By the early common law of England suicide was a felony and punishable
by forfeiture of the goods and chattels of the suicide and the ignominious
burial of his body in the highway. In New Jersey, by statute, the attempt
to commit suicide is an indictable offense. State v. Carney (1903) 69
N. J. L. 478, 55 Atl. 44.
However the general view is that the English law of suicide is not in accord
with the spirit of our institutions and in the absence of statute the act is not
a crime in the United States. May v. Pennell (1906) 101 Me. 516, 64 Atl.
885; Darrow v. Family Fund Society (1889) 116 N. Y. 537, 22 N. E. 1093.
But in some jurisdictions the compromise view that suicide is simply "un-
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lawful" and that one who, in attempting to commit suicide, kills another is
guilty of manslaughter prevails. Commonwealth v. Mink (1878) 123 Mass.
422; State v. Lindsey, supra.
The cases are also divided as to the effect of suicide pacts and of one person
aiding another to commit suicide. It is generally recognized that if two
persons encourage each other to commit suicide jointly and one succeeds
and the other fails in the attempt upon himself, the survivor is guilty of the
murder of the other. Even in states where suicide itself is not a crime this
result is reached. Blackburn v. Ohio (1872) 23 Ohio St. 146; Burnett v.
People (1903) 204 Ill. 208, 68 N. E. 505. One who furnishes another with
means for committing suicide at the latter's request may be guilty of murder.
People v. Roberts (1920) 211 Mich. 187, 178 N. W. 690; Commonwealth v.
Bowen (1816) 13 Mass. 356. Contra to these decisions is Sanders v. State
(1908) 54 Tex. Cr. Rep. 101, 112 S. W. 68, holding that since it is not a
violation of law for a person to commit suicide, one furnishing another the
means to the commission of suicide violates no law. E. M. H., '35.
MOTOR VEHICLES-REGISTRATION.-In the recent case of Furtado v.
Humphrey (Popkin v. Same, Warren v. Same) 188 N. E. 391, decided Dec. 28,
1933, Massachusetts has gone even farther in extending her peculiar doctrine
of the necessity of proper registration of automobiles in order to avoid the
taint of outlawry on the highways. Gen. Laws of Mass. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90,
paragraphs 2, 9. This doctrine- which allows the owner of an "improperly"
registered car no recovery for personal injuries or for injuries to his car
although a clear case of negligence exists against a third party seems to be
well established in Massachusetts. Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry. (1909)
202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25; Hanson v. Culton (1929) 269 Mass. 471, 169
N. E. 272. However, Georgia is the only one of a number of states having
similar registration statutes that follows the "outlawry" interpretation.
17 Iowa Law Rev. (1931) 1. c. 95, n. 4; 96, n. 6. There have been several
articles and notes containing well-directed criticism of the Massachusetts
rule. 17 Iowa Law Rev. (1931) 94; 95 Cent. L. J. 274 (1922) ; 32 Yale L. J.
394 (1922) ; 38 Harv. L. R. 531 (1924).
The case of Furtado v. Humphrey extends the doctrine of "outlawry" by
more strictly construing what shall constitute "proper registration." In
that case a Mr. Popkin, one of three partners, registered a truck owned
by the partnership under the following title, "United Produce Co. by B.
Popkin." In answering one of the statements required to be made under
the penalties of perjury-"Is this vehicle owned by you individually?"-
Popkin said "Yes"; and he did not answer "Yes" or "No" to the question-
"Or is it owned jointly or by a cooperative association or corporation?" The
court held that inasmuch as the Statute required that "application for the
registration of motor vehicles and trailers may be made by the owner thereof"
and as this requirement of statement of ownership is a matter made vital
by the Statute to be strictly construed the registration being in Popkin's
name alone when he was only joint owner, the truck was improperly reg-
istered (outlawed) and therefore Popkin, his partner, and the partnership
chauffeur could not recover for personal injuries and damages to the truck
although the defendant admits that "there was evidence upon which the
jury could have found him negligent." (Not only the owner of an improp-
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